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INTRODUCTION
With the unfolding process of reunification 
between two Koreas, it is important to explore how 
experts in Japan assess and understand the process and 
consequences of the reunification of the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea). Based on the 
insights from the fields of conflict analysis and resolu-
tion and psychology, this paper asks how experts 
frame the process of reunification and evaluate its 
impact on Japan. The collective frame explains the 
process of the assessment of social reality and mean-
ing-making in situation of uncertainty based on the 
already established interpretative schemata. The 
authors predict that incomplete knowledge about per-
ceptions, attitudes and beliefs of North Koreans 
among experts in Japan has led to the formation of 
expectations and predictions regarding reunification of 
South and North Koreas. It is also anticipated that 
these experts’ views were gained through their percep-
tions of relations between Japan and South Korea, of 
national identity, and of the position of Japan in the 
region.
Our research is based on the triangulation of 
qualitative methods that includes semi-structural inter-
views and focus group discussions as methods of data 
collection, and the phenomenological analysis as a 
method of data analysis. Our main sample consists of 
20 experts. In addition, 17 students were also inter-
viewed to check the level of propagation of the 
experts’ views in the public. The results show four 
major frames used by the respondents in their assess-
ment of the possibility of reunification of South and 
North Koreas: (1) protection; (2) moral responsibility; 
(3) restorative justice; and (4) peace. The respondents 
also expressed their opinions on perceived problems 
of reunification that can be united in three groups: (1) 
low support towards reunification among the popula-
tion in South Korea, (2) uneven political, economic 
and social status of South and North Koreas, and (3) 
the attributed position of North Korea on the reunifi-
cation.
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Abstract
With the unfolding process of reunification between two Koreas, Japanese experts have very limited informa-
tion to make reliable predictions. This study asks how experts in Japan assess and construct meaning of the 
reunification of two Koreas and evaluate its impact on Japan. Our assumption is that while Japanese experts have 
incomplete knowledge about perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of North Koreans, they form their expectations 
and predictions regarding reunification of two Koreas based on their views gained through their interactions with 
South Koreans as well as meanings of national identity and the perceptions of the position of Japan in the region. 
The results show that in assessing the possibility of reunification of two Koreas, the respondents used four 
major frames—(1) protection; (2) moral responsibility; (3) restorative justice; and (4) peace—with four overlap-
ping areas that united pairs of frames. All four frames represent the same structure: (1) a definition of the possible 
outcomes of the reunification, (2) a justification of this definition based on perceptions of national identity in 
Japan and relations between Japan and South Korea, and (3) prescriptions for future actions and policies. They 
also represented the three sets of perceived problems of reunification, expressed by all respondents: (1) low sup-
port towards reunification among the population in South Korea, (2) uneven political, economic and social status 
of two Koreas, and (3) the attributed position of North Korea on the reunification.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF 
FRAMES
The meaning of specific communicative acts 
gains meaning within larger interpretive frames⑴ that 
act as cognitive schemata or mental frameworks that 
define our perceptions, understandings and views of 
reality.⑵ They help us systematize our experience and 
provide normative prescriptions for possible actions. 
In dealing with the complex social reality, people 
employ these acquired structures of interpretation to 
examine, categorize and make meaning out of situa-
tions and experiences.⑶ Frames as a form of analytical 
constructs—“concrete and stable system of sym-
bols,”⑷ “conceptual scaffolding,”⑸ “primary 
frameworks,”⑹ or symbolic references⑺ —help us 
develop comprehension of the world organizing coher-
ent ideas essential for our perceptions and actions.⑻
It is important to underline that a frame defines 
not only our ways of interpretation of specific situa-
tions but also what particular issues or conditions 
receive our attention. They set specific expectations 
for what we should be looking for and what matters 
and what is important to notice.⑼ Within different 
frames, the same situation will be more or less impor-
tant for the observer and, thus, will have different 
meanings or significances.⑽ These frames can differ 
in terms of the scope and the level of conceptualiza-
tion.⑾ Broader, more expansive and inclusive 
interpretive frames are considered to be the master 
frames, such as frames of injustice, human rights, 
democracy and anti-globalization.⑿
In defining social reality, these master frames ful-
fil different functions. The social command frame 
defines social relations in terms of dominance and 
obedience, strength and weakness, control and depen-
dency, as well as threat and security.⒀ It is a 
hegemonic and oppressive construct that emphasizes a 
hierarchical order supported by coercive power. The 
social contest frame defines societal relations as a 
competition for scarce resources and opportunities 
between self-interested individuals. Within this frame, 
effective laws and institutions help organize social 
relations in affective and productive ways, however, 
social injustices and inequalities remain embedded in 
the society. The third frame, the social body frame, 
stresses the importance of interdependence, peace, jus-
tice and humanity for the well-being of every 
individual or group.⒁
A close analysis of the types of frames provides a 
foundation for understanding of how people contrast 
ingroup and outgroup in the process of framing. Gam-
son argues that people use three kinds of frames: 
“aggregate frames”; “consensus frames”; and “collec-
tive action frames.”⒂ Aggregate frames identify issues 
as social problems and motivate people for particular 
actions. Consensus frames stress a resolution approach 
to a social problem through collective actions. These 
types of frames contribute to the salience of ingroup 
identity, but do not position what the outgroup is 
accountable for this problem.  The concentration on a 
certain outgroup that creates a problem through essen-
tially wrong actions is evident in collective action 
frames. They also outline an adversarial relationship 
between the ingroup that is motivated and able to deal 
with the problem through collective actions and the 
outgroup that is profane and resisting the ingroup. 
Collective action frames are rooted in three compo-
nent frames: injustice, agency and identity.⒃ Similarly, 
Snow and Benford describe several types of frame that 
define how people deal with the social issues.⒄ ‘Diag-
nostic framing’ clearly outlines a problem and 
allocates a blame for the problem to a specific person 
or a group. ‘Prognostic framing’ provides ideas for 
solutions and detailed strategies, tactics and objec-
tives. ‘Motivational framing’ develops motivation to 
pursue the goals.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
Data for the study was collected in the capitol of 
Japan, Tokyo, during the Summer of 2018 through the 
use of face to face semi-structured interviews and 
focus group discussions. Each interview included six 
questions that were developed to explore the forma-
tion and functioning of interpretative frames, including 
the construction of ingroup and outgroup identities 
and meanings in the process of framing. For this pur-
pose, we concentrated on the importance of history 
and memory for national identity in Japan, the connec-
tion between interpretations of history and current 
conflicts between South Korea and Japan, and an 
assessment of the reconciliation process between 
South Korea and Japan, including official apologies 
made by successive Japanese governments. The list of 
questions included: How are history and memory 
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important for the national identity in Japan? How cur-
rent relationships between South Korea and Japan are 
affected by the history? Do you see the possibility of 
improving relationships between two Koreas? Will the 
reunification of two Koreas impact the relationship 
between Japan and the united Korea? Why is the post-
war settlement and reconciliation between South 
Korea and Japan still an issue? Why does South Korea 
perceive attempts of Japan to apologize as non-sin-
cere? What should be done to promote the 
reconciliation between Japan and Korea? Each indi-
vidual interview and focused group discussion lasted 
between one and two-and-a-half hours.
The sampling method employed for the study 
comprised snowballing with several entry points to 
ensure a diversity of views and attitudes. The final 
sample for individual interviews included 20 respon-
dents, including 16 academics (historians, political 
scientists, sociologists, and international relations 
scholars who work as university professors or scholars 
in think tanks), two representatives of non-govern-
mental organizations (including peacebuilding and 
youth organizations), and two doctoral students work-
ing on projects in the field of foreign affairs. Six of the 
interviewees were female and 14 were male; the age 
of the participants varied from 28 to 70, with the larg-
est group being approximately 45 years old. The 
interviews were conducted primarily in English, 
though an interpreter assisted in one interview. Given 
the majority of the interviewees write and communi-
cate in English in professional and international 
settings, English proficiency of most of the interview-
ees was high. The final sample for focused group 
discussions included 17 respondents, including BA 
and MA students from Waseda University and Interna-
tional Christian University in Tokyo. Ten interviewees 
were female and seven were male, and their age varied 
from 19 to 25. The interviews were conducted in Eng-
lish. Given all of them write and communicate in 
English in academic settings, and their English profi-
ciency was high.
The interview protocol was approved by the Insti-
tutional Research Board (Project Number: 1245830-
1). According to the protocol, the data in this study is 
to be confidential and no name could be mentioned in 
the analysis or presentation of the results.
Data Analysis
A phenomenological analysis was employed to 
analyze the interview data. This method of data collec-
tion enables researchers to understand what social 
boundaries people perceive in their understanding of 
past events and experiences in the context of today’s 
discourse. Several stages comprise a phenomenologi-
cal analysis. First, several themes were identified to 
manage large data clusters without losing the deep 
meaning of received information or the focus of the 
research questions.⒅ We formed specific clusters by 
merging similar or related themes and making a sum-
mary table of the structured themes. These clusters 
were independent from the six questions as many 
themes were cross-cutting across the questions. The 
analysis carried out on each individual interview con-
tributed to the generation of common and general 
themes for all or most of the interviews.⒆ The themes 
were then combined into four clusters related to four 
frames: (1) protection; (2) moral responsibility; (3) 
restorative justice; and (4) peace. Second, within each 
cluster, we identified factors that define the percep-
tions of possible reunification of two Koreas. Within 
each cluster, all respondents provided similar descrip-
tions, thus one coherent narrative is presented to 
describe each cluster. Third, we identify three clusters 
within perceived problems of reunification shared by 
all respondents independently of the frame they 
employ to discuss the effects of reunification.
In the result section, the descriptions of the 
frames are based on the analysis of the positions of 
our respondents and are not opinions of the authors. 
Through the analysis, we used various concepts as 
they were expressed by the respondents. For example, 
references to Japan are connected with the perception 
of Japan as a country, while references to Japanese 
people are connected with the perceptions of citizens 
of Japan. In Japan, people with Korean origin (both 
from North and South) form a special group called 
‘Zainichi’ Koreas. They were not treated as a distinct 
category in our research.
RESULTS
The data analysis revealed four major frames 
used by our respondents in describing their views on 
possible reunification of two Koreas. These four 
frames include (1) protection; (2) moral responsibility; 
(3) restorative justice; and (4) peace (see Pic. 1). We 
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also found four overlapping areas that united pairs of 
frames. Thus, both protection and restorative justice 
frames stress the importance of negotiation on com-
pensation for victims of Japanese occupation of Korea. 
The frames of protection and moral responsibility 
emphasize possible anti-Japanese feelings among 
North Koreans. The importance of returning Japanese 
citizens abducted by North Korea constitutes an 
important part of both restorative justice and peace 
frames. Finally, the frames of peace and moral respon-
sibility stress the importance of improving relations 
between Japan and the united Korea. We also found 
the perceived problems of reunification represented 
across all four frames, expressed by all respondents.
PROTECTION FRAME
This frame emphasizes the threat that the united 
Korea can pose to Japan. Many respondents stress that 
the reunification can help Koreans form a join front 
against Japan and it can negatively impact relations 
between the united Korea and Japan. As one respon-
dent states, “When two Koreas will have good 
relations, it will harm (their) relations with Japan.” 
Another respondent echoes, “South Korea and North 
Korea are anti-Japanese nations thus the (re)unifica-
t ion (of the two) can be a threat to Japan. 
Reunification of two Koreas can allow them to unite 
against Japan.” The respondents expect that the united 
Korea can become more hostile to Japan than the cur-
rent divided Koreas. As one respondent explains, 
“Nationalism in Korea will grow, so the united Korea 
will be more nationalistic and anti-Japanese.” These 
respondents also predict that the united Korea will 
have more power in the region, more control over the 
disputed island and more abilities to harm the position 
of Japan in the world. As one respondent describes, 
“Japan and South Korea should be allies, but if North 
Korea, with its positive relations with China, joints 
South Korea, it will be very damaging to Japan.” 
Some respondents stress that the worst-case scenario 
of the reunification is the genesis of a nuclear united 
Korea. As one respondent explains, “Seventy million 
people with nuclear weapons and good economy can 
be a strategic threat to Japan.” Another respondent 
seconds, “We see North Korea as more threating than 
South Korea. I hope that the threat will be reduced, 
and de-nuclearization will happen.”
This protection frame is deeply rooted in the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Problems of 
Reuniﬁca�on
Protec�on Moral 
Responcibility
PeaceRestora�ve Jus�ce
2. Possible anti-Japanese 
feelings among Koreans 
3. Return of abducted 
Japanese citizens 
4. Improving relations 
between Japan and Korea 
1. Compensation negotiation 
between N. Korea and Japan 
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opinion expressed by many respondents that there is 
limited knowledge among Japanese experts about the 
North Korean regime and (the feeling of) uncertainty 
about its position vis-a-vis reunification. As one 
respondent explains, “It is not clear how North Korea 
will change. It is a strange country because of its polit-
ical regime.” Another respondent also emphasizes the 
doubts, “We do not know how North Korea represents 
history. All we know is that North Korea has abducted 
(Japanese) people, so the reunification could bring 
more problems to Japan.”
To overcome this uncertainty, the respondents use 
their knowledge of South Korea and extrapolate them 
into the reunification process. Their perception of 
South Korea as a nationalistic country with its nation-
alism rooted in historical narratives helps them predict 
possible negative effects of the reunification. Respon-
dents believe that South Korea promotes negative 
stereotypes about Japan through salient anti-Japanese 
education. According to respondents, majority of 
South Koreans have accepted adverse attitudes toward 
Japan which were indoctrinated through the compul-
sory education in South Korea. As one respondent 
states, “Education in South Korea plays a very impor-
tant and negative role. Many people in South Korea, 
including students, are always reminded what Japan 
did during the era of colonization. They see them-
selves as victims of Japan’s aggression.” Another 
respondent echoes, “In South Korea, they are told that 
they are victims, and it is profound in their history 
education and national narratives. It shapes their per-
ception of the WWII.” Some respondents also 
underline that both media and public diplomacy in 
South Korea endorse nationalistic attitudes toward his-
tory between two countries portraying Japan in a very 
negative light. As one respondent states, “In South 
Korea, there is much more awareness about history. 
They employ very good public diplomacy and public 
opinion making based on history. Japan is not good at 
it.”
Majority of our respondents emphasize how 
South Korea employs historical narratives to spread 
nationalistic sentiments among its citizens as well as 
to increase its power in the international arena. As one 
respondent states, “South Korean Government is using 
this conflict to increase its power. They manipulate 
power and history to unite its country.” Another 
respondent describes, “For South Korea, the memory 
of Japanese occupation dominates. South Korea 
always tries to bring this issue, and Japan think they 
are using it to gain more power and influence.” Yet, 
another respondent echoes, “South Korea is deliber-
ately using the issues of comfort women and the 
disputed island for political purposes, bringing them to 
the international level and harming the image of Japan. 
It succeeds in undermining Japanese position by using 
the idea of victimhood. They use all available means.” 
Respondents consider such a use of a historical narra-
tive by South Korea as a tool for negotiating with 
Japan that helps South Korea maximize its gains.
Some respondents believe that this emphasis on 
history in South Korea arrives from the necessity to 
increase the sense of national unity among people. 
This focus on negative history and victimhood in 
domestic dynamics in South Korea. According to 
some respondents, this helps South Korean politicians 
to acquire and preserve their power. As one respondent 
states, “Victimhood and negative attitudes towards 
Japan unites people in South Korea. It is hard to 
become a politician there without catering to the pub-
lic. It is a self-trap there.” Respondents also stress the 
link between the historical discourses and the contem-
porary situation. Thus, according to them, Takeshima/
Dokdo island is a positive symbolic representation of 
the independence war and their national identity. As 
one respondent explains, “South Koreans did not get 
their independence as a result of their war efforts, it 
was brought by the U.S. victory. On the other hand, 
the island was taken forcefully from Japan by South 
Korea’s unilateral action, thus the island is a represen-
tative of the Korean victory.” Another respondent 
echoes, “The fight for the island is a representation of 
their national pride.” They also emphasize the role of 
civil society in shaping negative attitudes toward 
Japan. As one respondent explains, “They redefine 
violence and colonization as human right issues:  for 
them de-colonization and democratization are con-
nected.” Another respondent stresses “Civic movement 
brought up the comfort women issue and media con-
tributed to rising tensions.”
According to some respondents, this nationalistic 
approach to history in South Korea results in negative 
collective emotions, strong nationalism and negative 
perceptions of Japan. They also stress the persistence 
of these negative views on Japan among the public 
that are hard to challenge, much less change. They 
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extrapolate this negativity toward Japan to North 
Korea and believe that the reunification will require 
more defensive measures from Japan to protect their 
position in the region and the image in international 
relations. Thus, some respondents stress that the united 
Korea needs to convince Japan that it will be peaceful. 
However, according to them, there are no considerable 
or credible information that the unified Korea would 
neither be nuclear nor anti-Japanese. Respondents 
underscore the importance of protecting Japan’s inter-
es ts when two Koreas s ta r t the process of 
reunification.
This frame is connected to the justice frame as it 
stresses the possibility that North Korea will request 
compensations and retributions. One respondent states, 
“North Korea wants to receive money as we did not 
pay because we did not have diplomatic relations with 
them. Now North Korea can claim payments and com-
pensations.” While the process of compensation can 
be an excellent opportunity for Japan to make eco-
nomic contributions, and profit out of reconstruction 
and development business, these respondents frame 
the possible demand for payments from North Korea 
as an additional threat to Japan. They also underline 
the importance of protecting Japanese interests and 
positions. The frame of protection is also connected to 
the moral responsibility frame: they both emphasize 
possible anti-Japanese feelings among North Koreans. 
However, while the moral responsibility frame is 
rooted in the feeling of accountability of Japan for the 
division of Korea, the protection frame stresses nega-
tive feelings of citizens of both Koreas toward Japan 
that can result in aggressive actions of the united 
Korea.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FRAME
This frame is rooted in a deep feeling of moral 
responsibility of Japan for colonizing and mobilizing 
Koreans for the war as well as for the divisions of 
Koreas. Responders express a strong belief that as 
Japan is responsible for the division, the reunification 
represents a great opportunity for Japan to address this 
issue. As one respondent explains, “Division of Koreas 
in 1948 was a tragedy for everyone. It has led to a 
civil war. In 1950s, the U.S. needed an ally to fight 
against North Korea and thus it built cooperation with 
Japan. The participation of Japan in the Korean War 
provided a boost for Japanese economy. This divide 
was a mistake. Japan should have helped the reunifica-
tion and de-nuclearization of Korea.” Some 
respondents argue that in Europe, the aggressor state—
Germany—had been divided by the victorious powers, 
but in North East Asia, it was Korea that became a 
victim of ideological and territorial division. They 
acknowledge the role that Japanese aggression played 
in the partition of Korea.  As one respondent discusses, 
“As Japan did not surrender in time, it should take 
responsibility for the division of Korea and help the 
(re)unification process.”
The frame of moral responsibility rests on the 
perceptions of unfinished reconciliation between Japan 
and two Koreas.  Respondents acknowledge that many 
Japanese people, especially representatives of the 
older generation, have self-condemning attitudes and 
regrets regarding actions of Japan in Korea. Their feel-
ings are deeply rooted in pacifism and a belief that 
Japan needs to apologize and compensate for its colo-
nial policies in Korea. As one respondent states, 
“People feel very sorry for what Japan did to Korea, 
for colonialism and aggression, and believe that Japan 
needs to deal with it.” As another respondent verifies, 
“Japanese people feel guilty and nervous in relations 
with South Korea.” However, some respondents 
emphasize that the situation is changing.  As one 
respondent explains, “Feeling of guilt is still important 
among the older generation. Many older teachers were 
left-wing activists and sought a controlled education, 
but in 1980s such a trend disappeared, and teachers’ 
unions are no longer active.”
According to many respondents, this shift in the 
feeling of guilt and the importance of apology is 
rooted in the recent changes in history education and 
increasing collective amnesia.  Respondents empha-
size that in Japan the knowledge about Japanese 
occupation of Korea is very limited. As one respon-
dent clarifies, “In Japan, people do not know what 
really happened during the occupation, and thus, they 
are frustrated by South Korean Government’s attempt 
to bring an accusation again and again. Japanese only 
know the fact that Japanese colonization accelerated 
the modernization process of South Korea. They only 
have positive knowledge about the occupation and 
thus, do not understand why South Korea is still argu-
ing about it. They could not appreciate properly the 
significance of Japan’s colonization policies in Korea 
and thus, they could not understand why Koreans have 
11
Perception of Korean Reunification among Japanese Experts: The Collective Frame Approach
to raise this issue again and again.”
Many of respondents discuss that the colonial his-
tory in Japan is often denied and many facts regarding 
the number of victims and forced laborers are misrep-
resented. They point out the fact that very limited or 
absent portrayal of comfort women and colonization 
in history textbooks used in a compulsory public edu-
cation in Japan. This misinformation by the Japanese 
Government and its approach to history education, 
according to respondents, can be explained by “the 
need to rescue history from the victor’s interpreta-
tion.” Unable to deal with the difficult past, people 
discontinued thinking about history and turn to forget-
ting. As one respondent states, “It is hard to apologize 
and rescue history at the same time. It is a symbolic 
phenomenon that shows how deep historic amnesia 
progresses in Japan.” Another respondent emphasizes, 
“In Japan, people consider history belong to the past 
and do not want to return to it again and again.”
To address this dilemma of moral responsibility 
and a denial of history, many respondents underline 
the need for a historic analysis. As one respondent 
states, “Memory of the war is very important. All 
political and economic problems are discussed in 
terms of Japan’s war responsibility in the WWII.” 
Similarly, another respondent argues, “We need to 
start reviewing what we have done in the past. Both 
glories and mistakes are important for Japanese his-
tory. Japan has to face all of it.” These respondents 
believe that history of Japan’s colonial occupation and 
the role of Japan in the division of Korea should be 
represented in Japan’s history textbooks and should 
not be negated by the Japanese Government. It would 
help to approach the process of reunification of Korea 
from the point of moral responsibility and support 
both Koreas in this process.
This moral responsibility frame is interconnected 
with the protection frame. Many respondents discuss 
that because of the issue of Japan’s responsibility for 
the occupation and the subsequent division of Korea 
has not been adequately addressed, people in the 
united Korea could still hold very strong anti-Japanese 
feelings. As one respondent states, “Koreans believe 
that Japan benefited from the separation of Koreas and 
the Korean War.” Another respondent echoes, “People 
in both Koreas hold Japan responsible for the division 
and violence between Koreas.”  In addition, both 
frames of peace and moral responsibility underscore 
the importance of improving relations between Japan 
and Korea. However, if the peace frame sees better 
relations as a way to peace, the moral responsibility 
frame threatens them as an opportunity for Japan to 
finally make things right.
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FRAME
This frame highlights the importance of restor-
ative justice in relations between Japan and North 
Korea. It underlines that restorative justice is a recip-
rocal process that requires both compensation of 
victims of Japanese occupation policies in Korea and 
the return of Japanese abductees from North Korea. 
Many respondents state that victims of Japanese 
aggression who live in North Korea should be com-
pensated by Japanese Government. As one respondent 
stresses, “After the (re)unification, Japan needs to 
negotiate compensation with North Korea.” Another 
respondent echoes, “We need to discuss compensation 
with North Korea, because we have never done it.”
At the same time, many respondents emphasize 
that all abductees should be returned to Japan by North 
Korea. As one respondent stresses, “Japan is a victim 
in this relation. It is important to return victims of 
abduction.” Another respondent discusses, “Together 
with the compensation for North Koreans, the issue of 
abducted people should be resolved.” Other respon-
dents emphasize, “Japan should insist on returning the 
victims of abduction as it is an issue of human rights.” 
They believe that the reunification will create the con-
ditions necessary for the resolution of the abduction 
issue. As one respondent discusses, “We still need to 
remember abductions. Japanese citizens were not 
returned. The reunification of Korea is a hope for their 
return.”
According to some respondents, Korean reunifi-
cation will help deal with the legacy of colonialism. 
They believe that North Korea has more legitimacy in 
terms of dealing with the perpetrators of violence and 
war. As one respondent explains, “North Korea 
resolved the issue of the past, punished or expelled all 
collaborators with Japan while in South Korea many 
of the former perpetrators’ children are still in power.” 
As another respondent discusses, “South Korea did 
not deal with colonialism, have difficulties to face it, 
and it affects its relations with Japan. The approach 
that North Korea used toward the history may help to 
finish conversations about the war.” Thus, these 
12
早稲田大学高等研究所紀要　第 11号　2019年 3月
respondents think that North Korea has dealt the issue 
of the perpetrators of violence in a more ‘just’ manner 
than South Korea and that South Korea should adopt 
such an approach after the reunification.
The frame of restorative justice rests on the per-
ception of Japanese responsibility and an unfinished 
process of forgiveness on the part of Koreans. Thus, 
many respondents believe that the Japanese Govern-
ment’s apology is only partially complete or not 
sincere, with many politicians expressing opposite 
points of view. As one respondent states, “Japan issued 
an apology for only few things, it does not cover 
everything.” As one respondent describes, “Even some 
leaders apologize, (while) others continue to believe 
that Japan did all the right things. Some Japanese poli-
ticians cater to the conservative public that honestly 
believes that Japan did nothing wrong and thus 
demonize South Korea.” Another respondent echoes, 
“Japan never did enough for reconciliation, some poli-
ticians ignored or denied responsibility.” Many 
respondents believe that Japan should compensate the 
victims and sincerely apologize to them.
Another important basis for the justice frame is 
the belief in shared responsibility of both Japanese and 
South Korean Governments. Respondents state that 
Korean leaders also participated in colonization and 
collaborated with the Japanese Imperial Government. 
Thus, they see it as an issue of human rights of women 
and forced laborers that should be addressed by both 
Japanese and South Korean Governments. The respon-
dents believe that restorative justice will help to finally 
address the issues of the contentious past and accept 
responsibility of both Japanese and South Korean 
leaders for autocracies and violent polices toward the 
Korean people.
This restorative justice frame is connected to the 
peace frame as respondents believe that the reunifica-
tion will help the united Korea return Japanese 
abductees and thus restore peace and justice in the 
region. Both protection and restorative justice frames 
stress the importance of negotiation on compensation 
of victims of Japanese occupation of Korea. However, 
while the protection frame positions the possible claim 
of payments by North Korea as a threat to Japan and 
highlights the significance of protection of Japanese 
direct economic and diplomatic interests, the restor-
ative justice frame sees compensation for victims as 
an important foundation for justice and sustaining 
peace in the region.
PEACE FRAME
This frame emphasizes the importance of the 
reunification for the resolution of conflicts in the 
region and achieving peace. As one respondent states, 
“The (re)unification will create peace. I am very posi-
tive about it.” They also believe that the reunification 
will start a new post-war era of lasting peace that will 
finally resolve all the WWII related issues. Respon-
dents discuss positive outcomes of the reunifications 
for both relations between two Koreas as well as for 
the region. As one respondent states, “Now Koreas are 
divided as a nation in conflict. Their (re)unification 
will bring peace and improve relations in the region in 
general.” Another respondent echoes, “The (re)unifi-
cation is good, because it will improve relationships 
between Koreas. Recently observed joint participation 
in the Olympic game by both Koreas is a good devel-
opment.”
Many respondents also believe that the reunifica-
tion will help improve relations between Koreas and 
Japan. As one respondent discusses, “Koreas can 
improve relations with Japan when they both become 
more open.” Some respondents state that better rela-
tions between Koreas will lead to better interrelations 
with Japan because Japan will be less concerned about 
North Korea, nuclear weapons, and escalation of con-
flict in the region. One respondent explains, “Japanese 
people believe that they need to protect themselves 
from nuclear weapons in North Korea but if peace is 
achieved; we can start a positive communication with 
them.” Finally, some respondents believe that the 
reunification will help Japanese people to get more 
knowledge about North Korea which help them better 
understand Korea in general.
Some respondents also discuss that the peace in 
the region will be achieved through the cooperation 
between the new united Korea and Japan. They 
believe that this new alliance will help Japan to stand 
against Russia and China. As one respondent states, “It 
is very important to improve relations with Korea, as 
Japan is a small country. We face the same threats and 
need to unite with each other to face the rise of China 
and Russia.”
This frame is based on a deep belief among 
respondents that Japan is a country with a strong value 
of peace. Majority of them state that Japanese national 
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identity is not rooted in nationalistic or aggressive sen-
timents. They stress that public education in Japan 
avoids nationalism and it is rather a moral education 
that emphasizes what is right for the society, how to 
maintain social order, and what social norms are 
important for the society. As one respondent states, 
“There is no common meaning of identity and views 
on history in Japan. Education avoids emphasizing 
national identity, nationalism and patriotisms. Not a 
lot of respect for national symbols because they are 
connected to war.” Many respondents discuss that the 
war history had not only a negative impact on Japa-
nese national identity but also it generated strong 
inspirations and aspirations for peace among people. 
As one respondent stresses, “Being peaceful is the 
most important value for Japanese identity.” Another 
respondent explains, “History of the WWII made us 
very careful and peaceful, and very conscious about 
how easily you can become powerful and then fail. So, 
it is very important to be careful not to become nation-
alistic.” Thus, these respondents show that Japan 
promotes values of peace and sees the reunification of 
the two Koreas in the context of developing peace in 
the region.
The importance of returning Japanese abductees 
by North Korea constitutes an important part of both 
restorative justice and peace frames as they both stress 
that the reunification can help to restore justice and 
build peace in the region. Both frames of peace and 
moral responsibility highlight the importance of 
improving relations between Japan and Korea. How-
ever, while the moral responsibility frame treats 
improved relations between two Koreas as an opportu-
nity for Japan to finally make things right, the peace 
frame sees better relations between Japan and the 
united Korea as a way towards peace in the wider 
region.
PROBLEMS OF REUNIFICATION
Problems of reunification were discussed by 
respondents representing each of four frames. Inde-
pendently of a specific frame, problems can be 
organized in three clusters: (1) Low support among 
population in South Korea, (2) uneven status of 
Koreas, and (3) the position of North Korea toward 
reunification.
Many respondents discuss the low support among 
the population of South Korea as an impediment for 
the reunification. One of the reasons for this perceived 
disinterest in the reunification is widening gaps 
between generations. Respondents believe that older 
generations in South Korea want reunification because 
it was promoted by their parents as well as through the 
state education. However, younger generations are not 
interested in the united Korea. As one respondent 
states, “The higher number of older people in South 
Korea feel that it is good to unite Korea than younger 
people. Younger people do not see (re)unification as 
good.” Another reason for the low support discussed 
by our respondents is negative attitudes among people 
in South Korea toward its northern compatriots. Nega-
tive attitudes are especially strong among people who 
escaped from North Korea. As one respondent stress, 
“It is not easy for many people in South Korea, as they 
are against the reunification and see North Korea as 
their enemy.”
The second cluster of anticipated problems of 
reunification reflects concerns about uneven status of 
two Koreas and a deep gap that exists between them 
on political, economic and social spheres. As one 
respondent states, “Koreas are too different to be 
united. South Korea is more developed, but North 
Korea has more legitimacy in terms of the legacy of 
war.” Some respondents emphasize significant differ-
ences of the two Koreas and substantial costs of 
reunification, implying that the process of reunifica-
tions will be very costly and difficult. They also expect 
that former citizens of North Korea will be discrimi-
nated against the former citizens of South Korea in the 
united Korea. As one respondent discusses, “After the 
(re)unification, North Koreans will be treated as sec-
ondary people and tensions will raise between them 
and South Koreans. The gap is very wide.” Anticipat-
ing such complications, many respondents suggest that 
there should not be one united country of Koreans but 
rather efforts to build a better relation between them 
should be required.
Finally, respondents emphasize that the position 
of North Korea would be the main problem for the 
reunification process. They do not believe that North 
Korea would give up its nuclear weapons. As one 
respondent explains, “North Korea is aware of the cost 
of being swallowed. Kim (Jong-Unn) denies the possi-
bility of giving up his nuclear weapons. North Korea 
has successfully developed nuclear weapons to protect 
itself and get a world-wide attention. Kim would never 
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give them up, so the talk will eventually lead to a 
deadlock.” Other respondents discuss the imminent 
destruction of the regime in North Korea as a result of 
the reunification process, and stress that North Korean 
leadership is aware of such consequences and it would 
seek to preserve its power at any cost. As one respon-
dent states, “North Korea could not survive in this (re)
unification. If it introduces change, people would not 
want the North Korean Government any more. North 
Korea will be swallowed by the South.” Thus, our 
respondents are skeptical about the prospect of the 
reunification process and the probability of reestab-
lishing the united Korea.
DISCUSSION
The results of our study show that the respon-
dents used collective frames to systematize their 
knowledge and experience of dealing with South 
Korea, and provided normative prescriptions for pos-
sible actions, when they were addressing the issues of 
the reunification of North and South Koreas. It reflects 
the theoretical understanding of framing that a 
response to complex social realities would be deter-
mined based on already developed structures of 
interpretation, categorization and meaning-making. 
Depending on the theoretical notions about the types 
of collective framing, we assume that the process of 
framing will involve the construction of the meaning 
of Japan and Japanese people as an ingroup and North 
and South Koreas as an outgroup. Based on the 
description of the types of frames made by Gamson,⒇ 
we found that our respondents have used collective 
action frames, utilizing three main component frames: 
injustice, agency and identity. More specifically, the 
perception of the possible reunification of Korea can 
be described through (a) a definition of the reunifica-
tion within specific frames, (b) an identification of the 
possible problems or perspectives based on percep-
tions of relations between Japan and South Korea or 
the position and values of Japan, and (c) specific pre-
scriptions, strategies, and methods to deal with this 
situation and with South and North Koreas. As our 
research shows, each of the four frames has the similar 
structure, reflecting these three components: a defini-
tion, a justification and a normative prescription. This 
finding resonates with the description of diagnostic 
and prognostic framing made by Snow and Benford. 
However, we found components of both of these 
frames represented in opinions of our respondents.
Our analysis shows that the protection frame rep-
resents the prospective united Korea as a threat to 
Japan. The frame described the united Korea as 
extremely nationalistic, aggressive and anti-Japanese 
with the intentions to harm Japan and undermine its 
position in the world. This frame is deeply rooted in 
the belief that South Korea promotes negative percep-
tions of Japan and acts as its protagonist in the region. 
This frame prescribes a very careful approach to the 
reunification and developing strong protective mea-
sures against the united Korea.
The moral responsibility frame acknowledges the 
accountability of Japan for the division of Korea and 
describes the reunification process as a much-antici-
pated possibility to finally address the issue of war 
responsibility. This frame rests on the beliefs that 
Japan does not deal with its history in a rightful way. 
It suggests that Japan has an obligation and a moral 
duty to support the reunification process and help 
unite the separated Koreas.
The restorative justice frame emphasizes the 
importance of reciprocity in relations between two 
Koreas and Japan. It is based on the perceptions of the 
unfinished process of reconciliation and the failure of 
Japan and South Korea to collaboratively and effec-
tively address the issues of the past. It requires the 
compensation for the victims of Japanese occupation 
who now live in North Korea as well as the return of 
all Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.
The peace frame provides a very positive and 
optimistic view on the reunification as an opportunity 
to finally resolve conflicts and create peace in the 
region. It is rooted in the belief that Japan is a peaceful 
nation and values collaboration and concord in the 
region. It prescribes support for the reunification pro-
cess and the participation of Japan in the regional 
cooperation for such a process.
These four frames can be described as the social 
contest frames and social body frames. The protec-
tion frame that defines societal relations as a 
competition for power, and it emphasizes the need for 
security is a representation of social contest frames. 
Other three frames—moral responsibility, restorative 
justice and peace—are social body frames that high-
l ight the s ignif icance of peace, just ice and 
reconciliation in relations between nations.
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CONCLUSION
The possibility of reunification of Korea creates 
multiple discussions and diverse opinions among Jap-
anese experts. According to our respondents, the 
information about North Korea is very limited, thus 
experts in our interviews relied on their knowledge 
about social and political processes in South Korea, 
the dynamics of relations between Japan and both 
Koreas, and meanings of national identity of Japan. 
Despite differences in opinions, our study has helped 
identify four major frames that represent the position 
of experts toward reunification. These frames range 
from the expectations of increasing threat to the pros-
pects of peace and justice. However, all four frames 
represent the same structure: (1) a definition of the 
possible outcomes of the reunification, (2) a justifica-
tion of this definition based on perceptions of national 
identity in Japan and relations between Japan and 
South Korea, and (3) prescriptions for future actions 
and policies.
The study also reveals the clusters of problems 
that, according to our experts, can impede the reunifi-
cation process. The first cluster is based on the low 
support toward reunification among the population in 
South Korea, especially among younger generations 
and people who defected from North Korea in the 
past. The second cluster includes different dimensions 
of the uneven status of Koreas: economic, political 
and social. The third cluster describes the problematic 
position of North Korean leadership toward reunifica-
tion and its unwillingness to give up its nuclear 
weapons and power.
As the process of reunification will unfold and 
more information about North Korea will be available 
to experts in Japan, their opinions may change. How-
ever, the authors believe that the four frames that our 
study has revealed will continue to define major pat-
terns of perceptions and attitudes among Japanese 
experts toward the reunification of South Korea and 
North Korea.
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